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ABSTRACT 
 
Travis A. Dyer: Does Public Information Acquisition Level the Playing Field  
or Widen the Gap? An Analysis of Local and Non-Local Investors 
(Under the direction of Mark Lang) 
 
 
While prior studies have speculated that local investors have an information advantage as 
a result of private information, I examine whether local investors generate an information 
advantage through their use of public information. Using novel data on professional investors’ 
requests for financial information from the SEC, I document that investors acquire more 
financial information for their local investments, and that local investors are more timely at 
acquiring newly released disclosures. Consistent with public information being more valuable to 
local investors, I find that investors make more profitable trading decisions in local stocks when 
they also acquire public financial information. Lastly, I find that investors’ preference to over-
weight local stocks in their investment portfolio (“Local Bias”) is increasing in the amount of 
public information acquired. These results suggest that the use of public information may widen 
the information gap between local and non-local investors rather than level the playing field. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Many claim that investors have a private information advantage in local stocks, which 
causes them to tilt their allocation of invested wealth towards geographically proximate 
investments (French and Poterba, 1991; Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Coval and Moskowitz, 
2001; Cooper et al. 2012). But what is the role of public information for local and non-local 
investors? On one hand, public information might substitute for private information advantages 
and therefore be used as an equalizer to reduce the private information advantages of local 
investors. On the other hand, if public and private information act as complements, then local 
investors might use public information to widen their information advantage. In this study, I 
examine public information acquired by professional investors to see (1) if investors acquire 
more public information for local or non-local investments, (2) if public information is more 
valuable to local or non-local investors, and (3) if public information acquisition mitigates or 
moderates investors’ preference to over-weight local stocks in their investment portfolio (i.e., 
“Local Bias”).1 
In this study, I construct and utilize a direct measure of professional investor information 
acquisition. Until recently, research on investor information retrieval has been quite challenging 
to study directly (Drake et al, 2015; Drake et al, 2016; Lee et al. 2015; Loughran and McDonald, 
2015). With the release of EDGAR log files by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
                                                 
1
 “Local Bias” is the term used in academic literature to describe the well-documented phenomenon that investors 
tilt their allocation of invested wealth towards geographically proximate investments in the United States (Coval and 
Moskowitz, 1999). The reference to bias in the term does not imply that the phenomenon is a result of a behavioral 
bias.  
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the barriers to this stream of literature have been removed. EDGAR is a large repository of all 
public financial information provided to and maintained by the SEC. The EDGAR log files 
contain each request received by the EDGAR system, documenting a partially masked IP address 
performing the request, the timing of request, and the filing requested.  
Using ARIN WhoWas reports, I am able to unmask the identity of IP addresses that 
download documents from EDGAR and directly link specific professional investor institutions to 
their information requests on EDGAR. This process not only allows me to know where the 
investor is located, but also allows me to link in other investor-level data, such as investors’ 
public 13(f) holdings. This process results in linking approximately 9,810 professional investors 
to EDGAR download data. The most research-active professional investor companies in my 
sample include companies such as JP Morgan and Citi Group. The most frequent locations of 
professional investors include New York City and Chicago.  
The richness of the underlying data provides this study the opportunity to implement a 
unique and robust research design. In its simplest form, the data is a record of an investor’s 
request for firm information. The same investor can request information for multiple firms, and 
the same firm can have multiple investors requesting information. Because of this feature, I can 
include an investor-time fixed effect, which controls for the average research activity by an 
investor in a given period of time. Additionally, I can include a firm-time fixed effect, which 
controls for the average research for a firm in a given period of time. The combination of these 
effects controls for attributes such as an investor’s location, skill, risk appetite, and resources, as 
well as a firm’s size, visibility, risk, and performance in that period of time. The remaining 
variation in research behavior is abnormal for both the investor and firm in that time period. As 
 3 
such, the scope of alternative explanations for observing a proximity effect on information 
retrieval drastically narrows. 
Using this research design and sample of professional investors, I find evidence that 
investors tend to download more information from EDGAR for proximate investments.2 For 
example, each calendar quarter investors access 20.16% more kilobytes of information if they 
are within 100 kilometers of the investment.3 Additionally, this positive relation is quite 
pervasive. It exists for multiple proxies of information acquisition. It persists across all major 
form types filed with the SEC, including both annual and quarterly reports, as well as material 
disclosures (i.e., 8-Ks). The local effect also persists throughout the entire investment 
relationship. I also find that research by local investors tends to be particularly concentrated 
around informational events. This evidence suggests that investors obtain more public 
information for local investments and is consistent with investors choosing to use public 
information to widen their information advantage, rather than to mitigate their information 
disadvantages.  
One concern with the prior analyses is that an investor’s choice to acquire information 
about a firm is endogenous to their choice to follow the firm. To address this concern, I perform 
an analysis using plausibly exogenous variation in investor proximity. To obtain this variation I 
use a sample of firms who chose to relocate their firm headquarters. Prior work suggests that 
firm headquarter locations are determined based on strategic business decisions related to lower 
taxes, lower employee wages, and better airport facilities (Strauss-Kahn and Vives, 2009). I 
                                                 
2
 A candidate correlated omitted variable is the level of investment in a stock. Investors might research more for 
stocks that make up a greater proportion of their portfolio. This is important since research confirms investors hold 
larger portfolio positions in local stocks (i.e., “Local Bias”). In robustness tests, I control for the level of investment 
and find similar results. 
 
3
 I follow Coval and Moskowitz (2001) which uses 100 kilometers as an indicator of being proximate to an 
investment. As discussed in later sections, inferences are robust to alternative cutoffs and measurements. 
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believe that it is unlikely that the decision of where to relocate a firm’s headquarters is made by 
executives based on the preferences of investors for proximity.4 In this setting, if investors who 
exogenously become local request more information about the firm after the headquarter change, 
then proximity, rather than firm selection, is the dominant factor affecting their information 
acquisition decisions. With this sample of firms, I find evidence consistent with proximity to 
investments leading to increased information acquisition by professional investors. 
I next explore the value of the observed asymmetric public information acquisition. Prior 
work surrounding local investors’ trading profitability more generally is mixed with some 
finding that investors are more profitable in local investments and others the opposite (Coval and 
Moskowitz, 2001; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005; Massa and Simonov, 2006; Seasholes, 2010; 
Bernile et al. 2016). One could argue that asymmetric information might exist, but that it does 
not provide actionable value to investors’ portfolios. As such, I measure the value of public 
information for local investors in two ways: (1) enhanced speed of acquisition, and (2) enhanced 
portfolio decision-making. First, obtaining public information in advance of other investors is 
often valuable. For example, investors achieve trading profits through the advance access to 
consumer reports (Mullins et al., 2013). If local investors obtain public information more quickly 
than their non-local counterparts, then they have the opportunity to make use of the information 
more rapidly than the average investor. This speed advantage might even discourage non-local 
investors from performing as much stock research in the first place. I provide evidence that 
investors tend to acquire public information more rapidly for local investments. Looking at the 
two days following the release of SEC filings, I find that investors arrive at the public filing of 
their local investments approximately 30 minutes sooner than that of their non-local investments. 
                                                 
4
 This assumption is likely valid since there are multiple investors spread across the country, each possibly vying for 
increased proximity to the firm. 
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Looking at only the 60 minutes following the release, I also find that local investors still have a 
time advantage. Since investors have autonomy over when they access the new disclosures, these 
tests provide investors’ revealed preference for timeliness. As such, the findings suggest 
investors value timeliness of information retrieval more for local stocks. 
Second, a more direct measure of value is the potential benefit of public information for 
improving portfolio allocation decisions. I explore this possibility by linking professional 
investors’ research on EDGAR with their 13(f) portfolio holdings data. With this data, I first 
confirm that more research about a stock improves investors’ portfolio choices. I find that share 
purchases are more positively related to future returns when institutional investors perform 
research about a stock. Specifically, future returns tend to be 27 basis points higher (lower) when 
share purchases (sales) are coupled with public information research. More importantly, I find 
that the benefit of stock research for portfolio decisions is approximately 54 basis points larger 
for local stocks. This evidence suggests that public information is, on average, more valuable to 
local investors.  
 I conclude the paper by looking at the relation between “Local Bias” and public 
information acquisition. A large stream of literature suggests that asymmetric private information 
between local and non-local investors is a driving force behind investors’ preference to tilt their 
portfolios toward local stocks, a phenomenon which prior research has dubbed “Local Bias.” If 
public information is a contributing force to investors’ “Local Bias,” then an investor’s “Local 
Bias” should vary with the amount of public information acquired about the stock. Alternatively, 
if “Local Bias” is the result of a non-information-based force, then “Local Bias” should be 
unrelated to an investor’s information acquisition. Using the sample of 13(f) institutional 
investors, I find that an investor’s “Local Bias” is increasing in the amount of public information 
 6 
acquired about the stock. This suggests that a contributing force to investors’ “Local Bias” is the 
amount of public information acquired and is consistent with information asymmetries 
motivating investors to allocate more wealth toward local investments. 
This paper is motivated on four fronts. First, one of the regulatory objectives of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is to “level the playing field” among investors 
through public financial disclosure (SEC, 2000). Put into context, the SEC’s objective is to 
equalize the information sets available to investors. According to the SEC, the primary purpose 
for providing public filings on EDGAR is to “increase the efficiency and fairness of the 
securities market” (SEC, 2010). This paper explores which investors benefit most from public 
disclosures and whether investors choose to acquire public information in a manner consistent 
with either equalizing or diverging information sets across investors. 
Second, there is a large disagreement among academics about whether local investors 
have asymmetric information. Some contend that local investors have valuable private 
information (Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005; Massa and Simonov, 2006), while others contend 
no such information seems to exist (Seasholes, 2010) or largely disappeared at the turn of the 
century (Bernile et al., 2016). Additionally, other streams of research attribute “Local Bias” to 
behavioral rather than information-based explanations (Coopers et al., 2012). I speak to this 
ongoing debate by observing the public information sets of investors and examining whether 
information asymmetries exist.  
Third, Cooper et al. (2012) suggests that researchers should attempt to identify the source 
of local investors’ information advantage, should it exist. Recent theoretical work by Van 
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) suggests that public information may be one source of the 
asymmetry. Directly pertinent to this study, they predict that, under a reasonable set of 
 7 
assumptions, investors will acquire more public information for local stocks if they are endowed 
with a small local information advantage. My paper explores this possibility by investigating 
whether investors acquire more public information for local or non-local stocks. 
Fourth, “Local Bias” is an economically large phenomenon. Prior work on “Local Bias” 
finds that the typical US household allocated 30% of their portfolio to local stocks even though 
those same stocks make up only 12% of the total US market on average (Seasholes and Zhu, 
2010). This 18% gap in US investor diversification equates to approximately $1.12 trillion or 
6.4% of GDP in the year 2014.5 Other research finds that “Local Bias” also exists for mutual 
fund investors (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Bernile et al. 2016). “Home Bias,” the international 
equivalent to “Local Bias,” is also quite large. According to Investment Company Institute 
(2015), only 25% of US equity mutual fund assets were in equity funds focused on foreign 
markets in 2014, with foreign markets encompassing 55% of the world market (Ferri et al., 
2013). Therefore, understanding the extent to which public information acquisition mitigates or 
moderates investors’ “Local Bias” is economically important. 
This paper contributes to the budding literature on information retrieval. Prior research in 
this area studies the determinants and consequences of information retrieval at the firm level 
(Drake et al., 2015; Drake et al., 2016), the filing level (Lee et al., 2015; Loughran and 
McDonald, 2015), and the geographic level (Mondria et al., 2010; Drake et al., 2017). My study 
builds upon this literature by disaggregating information retrieval to the investor level. To my 
knowledge, this study provides the first direct test of how proximity between investors and firms 
relates to public information retrieval. 
                                                 
5
 US registered investment companies hold $15.9 trillion total mutual fund assets, with 52% in equity investments 
and 75% of those holdings in US equities (Investment Company Institute, 2015). Thus 1.12 = (15.9*.52*.75*.18) 
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More generally, this paper speaks to a broad literature on portfolio choice and 
profitability. Prior academic research provides convincing evidence that investors tilt their 
portfolio toward geographically proximate investments (Cooper et al., 2012) and suggests this 
might be related to asymmetric private information advantage. This study provides input-based 
evidence that local and non-local investors create asymmetric information sets using public 
information. Furthermore, this study builds on prior research that documents increased 
profitability of investors in local stocks (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 
2005; Giannini et al., 2015; Bernile et al., 2015) and provides evidence consistent with public 
information being one channel through which this advantage occurs. 
This paper also contributes new insights into how investors gain their local information 
advantage. Prior research using Twitter and stock message boards suggests that local investors 
have more information about local investments. Giannini et al. (2015) finds that the content in 
Twitter posts are more predictive of future stock performance when written by local users. 
Huang et al. (2012) finds that message board users in China post more about local stocks. This 
study complements these findings and suggests that one channel through which local investors 
increase their information advantage is the acquisition of public information. 
 While I have attempted to mitigate potential concerns, the results are subject to caveats. 
First, causal inferences need to be appropriately caveated. Even though the research design 
choices and other robustness tests mitigate several omitted-variable biases and reverse causality 
concerns, it is possible that alternative explanations persist. Second, while I perform several data 
screens and robustness tests to increase confidence that my analyses capture actual investors, 
there is still the possibility that my sample continues to include other users of financial 
 9 
statements. Nonetheless, this analysis provides novel information on the impetus of public 
information acquisition. 
 In the next section, I discuss relevant literature and present my primary hypotheses. In 
Section 3, I discuss the data and methodology. I provide both empirical results and robustness 
analysis in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
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CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Prior academic literature often speculates that local investors have a private information 
advantage over non-local investors. However, the role of public information for local and non-
local investors has received little attention. The relation between public and private information 
in this setting is not obvious. One possibility is that local private information may act as a 
substitute for publicly available information. Accordingly, the incentive to acquire public 
information on local stocks would be mitigated by local private information. The concept of 
public and private information acting as substitutes is quite common. An example of this is found 
in a recent study of IRS public information acquisition. Bozanic et al. (2017) finds that the IRS’s 
incentive to acquire public information from EDGAR decreased after they obtained access to 
private tax information. Furthermore, the SEC catch phrase “level playing field” asserts a 
substitutive nature between public and private information.  
Studies on “Local Bias” in particular have made the argument of substitutes. Lewis 
(1999) highlights a main counterargument to observing information asymmetries between local 
and non-local investors by writing, “Greater uncertainty about foreign returns may induce the 
investor to pay more attention to the data.” This reasoning is built on the premise that public and 
private information are substitutes. In recent theoretical work, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 
(2009) investigate investors’ decision to acquire public information. They model investors 
endowed with a small initial local advantage and find that, given equal access to local and non-
local information (i.e., public information), a constraint on information acquisition, and a fixed 
portfolio, investors acquire more information about non-local investments. Since investors 
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cannot change their portfolio return, they prefer to acquire information that reduces the most 
portfolio risk (i.e., information for non-local investments). 
The second possibility is that public and private information act as complements. 
Accordingly, the incentive to acquire public information about local stocks would be greater with 
local private information. Mosaic theory, for example, suggests that the combination of non-
material private information with public information creates an information mosaic that is more 
valuable than the sum of the individual parts. Prior research has documented that under certain 
circumstances, public information may act complementary to private information. Research 
studying public disclosure of earnings has observed increases in intra-day spreads, consistent 
with a complementarity between public and private information (Lee et al., 1993). Van 
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) predicts that when investors have the joint decision to 
acquire public information as well as make portfolio investment choices they choose to acquire 
more information about local investments. In this setting, prices reveal the average investor’s 
knowledge. Learning about non-local assets sacrifices excess returns, since both local and non-
local investors have knowledge of future payouts. If investors instead learn about local assets, 
prices will only reflect as much information as the average investor knows. As the authors put it, 
“Investors profit more from knowing information others do not know.” 
Whether public information is a substitute or complement to local private information is 
an empirical question. Given the preceding discussion, I formulate the following hypothesis in 
the null form:  
H1: The amount of public information acquired by an investor is unrelated to their 
proximity to investment. 
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I next investigate the value of public information to local and non-local investors. Prior 
research surrounding local investors’ trading profitability has found that local investors make 
either more profitable trading decisions (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 
2005; Massa and Simonov, 2006), less profitable trading decisions (Seasholes, 2010) or that the 
profitability has decreased at the turn of the century (Bernile et al. 2016). Based on the 
conflicting results, one question is whether the asymmetric public information provides 
actionable value to an investor’s portfolio. If public information is a complement [substitute] to 
local private information, then public information for local [non-local] investments should be 
more valuable to investors. However, if public information is stale or irrelevant for portfolio 
holdings purposes, then there may be no value to asymmetric information acquisition. Stated in 
the null form: 
H2: The value of public information is unrelated to an investor’s proximity to the 
investment. 
I lastly explore the relation between “Local Bias” in invested wealth and public 
information acquisition. Prior academic literature finds that both mutual fund managers and 
individual investors exhibit “Local Bias” in equity portfolios (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; 
Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005; Massa and Simonov, 2006; 
Seasholes and Zhu, 2010). However, there is much debate on why this behavior exists (Cooper et 
al., 2012). A major theory on the topic is asymmetric private information advantages (Coval and 
Moskowitz, 1999; Coval and Moskowitz, 2001), but other explanations include relative wealth 
hedging (Massa and Simonov, 2006), transaction costs (Choe et al., 2005), familiarity 
(Huberman, 2001), loyalty (Cohen, 2009), patriotism (Morse and Shive, 2011), and 
overconfidence (Graham et al., 2009). The crucial ingredient separating asymmetric information 
 13 
advantages from the other theories is the presence of private information held only by local 
investors.  
If public information is used more by non-local investors (i.e., substitutes for private 
information), then it should mitigate “Local Bias” under the asymmetric information advantage 
theory. Alternatively, if public information is used more by local investors (i.e., complements 
private information), then it should further increase “Local Bias.” The later explanation is 
consistent with Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009), which predicts that the use of public 
information increases “Local Bias.” In contrast, if “Local Bias” is driven a non-information 
based explanation, then acquired public information should be unrelated to investors’ “Local 
Bias.” Stated in the null form: 
H3: Local Bias is unrelated to public information acquisition. 
 14 
CHAPTER 3: DATA AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
3.1 Sample Construction and Characteristics 
I use EDGAR log files to capture information acquisition by investors. Critical to my 
study, EDGAR log files retain the masked IP address, the filing acquired, and the time of each 
information request. Similar to prior studies which use EDGAR log files, I exclude (1) self-
identified web crawlers, (2) IP addresses that make more than 1,000 requests in a day, (3) IP 
addresses that request filings for more than 100 firms in a day, (4) server codes of 300 or greater 
(e.g., URL not found), and (5) information requests of index files and images (Drake et al., 2015; 
Lee et al., 2015; Loughran and McDonald, 2015). 
I next match masked IP addresses requesting EDGAR filings with IP address ownership 
data from ARIN WhoWas reports.6 WhoWas reports are similar to the more common WhoIs 
reports, but instead provide historical ownership information for IP addresses rather than just the 
current ownership information. If the entire IP address block is owned by an entity in a given 
period, I assign that entity’s name to the IP address in question.7 I identify investors from these 
names by manually categorizing the 4,000 most used names in my sample. For the remaining 
names, I use keywords associated with investment advisors identified in the initial 4,000 names.8 
                                                 
6
 Given the limitations on ARIN WhoWas requests, I limit requests to IP address blocks with more than 10 
observations in my sample. 
 
7
 Since the last octet of IP addresses provided in the SEC log files are scrambled (e.g., 12.25.278.ajc), I refer to an 
“IP address block” as the range of possible IP addresses (e.g., 12.25.278.0 through 12.25.278.255). 
 
8
 These key words include variations of the words: Asset Management, Bank, Broker, Capital, Causality, 
Commerce, Credit, Equity, Fiduciary, Fund, Leasing, Ledger, Lendor, Insurance, Investment, Investor, Merchant, 
Mortgage, Mutual, Pension, Profit, REIT, Saving, Securities, Trade, Trust, Underwriter, and Wall Street. 
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For the entirety of my analyses, I use the resulting sample of IP addresses categorized as 
investors and refer to these investors as professional investors.9 The sample of EDGAR data 
employed in this study ranges from the first quarter of 2003 to the first quarter of 2015. Table 1 
Panel A reports the top 10 most research active professional investor companies. As to be 
expected, this list includes companies such as JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo. 
Table 1 Panel C reports the time-series variation in the number of professional investors 
identified using EDGAR. In general, the number of professional investors using EDGAR has 
remained relatively constant over the sample period. 
I obtain location data from two sources. Investor location data is obtained from 
IP2Location, which links zip codes to specific IP addresses.10,11 To obtain the zip code location 
of the firm whose information is being acquired, I use the header information from SEC 10-K 
and 10-Q filings. Specifically, I used the zip code used for the business address. If zip code data 
is missing or changes over the sample period, I exclude these investors and firms from the main 
sample.12 As such, for the main analyses, proximity between firms and investors is time 
invariant. Following prior literature (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999), I exclude zip codes from 
Alaska, Hawaii, and all US territories.  
Table 1 Panel B reports the top 10 most frequent cities for professional investor firms. I 
find that New York, Atlanta, and Chicago are very common cities for professional investors. 
This list generally aligns with priors on cities with strong financial centers. Figure 1A illustrates 
                                                 
9
 In later robustness tests, I used non-professional investor IP addresses in EDGAR and reach similar conclusions.  
 
10
 I use IP2LOCATION-LITE-DB9 available at http://lite.ip2location.com. 
 
11
 Since EDGAR masks the last octet of IP address in the publicly available log files, there are instances where it 
cannot be determined which zip code to assign a given IP address. I remove these IP addresses from my sample. 
 
12
 As described later in further detail, I used some firms that change headquarter locations during the sample period 
for a robustness test. 
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the geographic distribution of professional investor EDGAR users across the United States. From 
this figure, we observe that the use of EDGAR seems to be spread across the United States, 
suggesting that EDGAR use has not been confined to just a few large cities. This is reassuring, as 
variation in professional investor location is vital to testing the relation between information 
acquisition and proximity to investment. Figure 1B illustrates the geographic distribution of 
company headquarters in my sample across the United States. Both investor location and 
company headquarters location tend to be found in or near large cities, but are relatively spread 
across the United States. 
3.2 Research Design and Variable Construction 
A major strength of this study is the research design implemented throughout each of the 
analyses, which capitalizes on the available counterfactual or benchmark groups using a variety 
of fixed effects. Since investors research multiple investments at any given point in time, an ideal 
benchmark for an investor’s research behavior for a local firm is the same investor’s research 
behavior for a distant firm during the same time period. Using a within investor-time analysis 
strengthens identification by removing possible correlated omitted variable biases relating to 
fixed investor attributes in that time-period (i.e., investor location, investor type, investor risk 
appetite, investor resources, investor wealth, etc.). In tandem with an investor-time analysis, I 
also incorporate a firm-time benchmark, which controls for fixed firm characteristics in that time 
period (i.e., firm size, firm risk, firm visibility, firm performance, the amount of information 
available for request, etc.). The combination of within investor-time and within firm-time 
analyses increases internal validity by removing a host of alternative explanations in each of the 
analyses. What remains after incorporating these two fixed effect structures is variation 
associated with the pair itself, investor and firm.  
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 Following the approach recommended in Gormley and Matsa (2014), each of the 
empirical designs uses a high-dimensional fixed effects structure.13 To test whether investors 
consume more or less public information for local investments (H1) I use the following research 
design:  
 ,, =  
 ∙ , +  
, + 
, +  ,, ( 1 ) 
PIA represents the amount of public information acquisition by investor i about firm j in period t 
and Local is an indicator if the investor is local to the investment. Coefficients αi,t and αj,t 
represent the investor-time and firm-time fixed effects, respectively. H1 is rejected in favor of 
the alternative hypothesis if α1 is significantly different from zero. If α1 is also positive [negative] 
then the results would be consistent with public and private information acting as complements 
[substitutes].  
I measure the amount of public information acquired by investors (PIA) using four 
measures. The first is the total kilobyte size of files requested for the first time (SumSize). This is 
intended to capture the amount of new information an investor is acquiring during the quarter. 
The logic behind this measure is that the amount of information in a filing is likely related to the 
number of kilobytes in the filing. The second and third measures are the number of files 
requested for the first time (InitialDownloads) and the number of files requested for a second 
time or more (Redownloads). Each of these variables are measured over calendar quarters and 
are logged to reduce the influence of outliers.14,15 The fourth measure is the principal component 
                                                 
13
 Gormley and Matsa (2014) recommends fixed effects over adding means of dependent variables as controls. They 
further recommend certain Stata functions when faced with high-dimensional fixed effects. This paper uses reghdfe. 
Additional information is available on their website: http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~tgormley/papers/fe.html. 
 
14
 The volume of EDGAR requests is such that evaluating inferences on a quarterly basis, instead of a weekly or 
daily basis, makes estimation more computationally feasible. 
 
15
 Results are robust to using the unlogged variables. 
 18 
of the previous three measures (Factor).16 For all of the above information acquisition variables, 
interim periods where professional investors do not acquire any information about a company 
they follow are categorized as zero.17 Local is an indicator variable set to one if the geodesic 
distance between the investor zip code and the firm headquarters zip code (i.e., as the crow flies) 
is less than 100 kilometers (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001).18 All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level by quarter. Standard errors are clustered by investor and 
firm. 
I test the value of public information for local and non-local investors (H2) using two 
approaches. The first approach focuses on the timing of information acquisition. An enhanced 
speed in acquiring information affords investors the ability to make more timely trading 
decisions on new information. In other words, speed is valuable to investors. If investors tend to 
acquire filings more rapidly for local or non-local firms, then investors’ have the opportunity to 
act more quickly on information for local or non-local firms. For this analysis, I look at 
professional investor requests on EDGAR in either the two days and one hour following the 
release of public filings on EDGAR. Similar to equation (1), I evaluate the timing of information 
retrieval using the following research design: 
  ,, =   ∙ , + , + , +  ,, ( 2 ) 
Where Retrieval Delay is measured as the difference in minutes between the investor’s retrieval 
time of the filing and the time at which the filing was released. Since the exact time of day that 
                                                 
16
 I retain only one factor from this analysis based on tests of eigenvalues being greater than one, the scree plot, and 
a parallel analysis.  
 
17
 I categorize investors as following a firm if they search for a firm’s financial information in two or more calendar 
quarters. Conclusions are similar in sign, significance, and magnitude if observations with information acquisition of 
zero are excluded.  
 
18
 Giannini et al. (2015) uses a cutoff of 100 miles, while Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007) uses a cutoff of 250 miles. 
The results are not sensitive to these alternative cutoffs. 
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the filings were released is unknown, I use the timing of the first acquirer as a proxy. If δ1 is 
significantly different from zero, then this suggests that investors value the timeliness of public 
disclosure access differently for local and non-local investments. 
 The second method I employ to test H2 is a more direct measure of value and focuses on 
investors’ trading profitably. Prior literature suggests that investors are more informed about a 
stock if their buy decisions are more positively correlated with future returns (Maffett, 2012). I 
expand this structure in two steps. First, I investigate whether buy decisions are more informed 
when coupled with public information acquisition. As such, I interact this relation with public 
information acquisition. Second, to test if public information is more valuable for local or non-
local investors (H2), I further interact the relation with an indicator for local investments. The 
culminating research design is as follows: 
,+1 = !1 ∙ , + !2 ∙ ,−1 + !3 ∙ %ℎ',(, + !4 ∙ ,(
+ !
5
∙ +ℎ,(, + !6 ∙ ,( ∙ +ℎ,(, + !7 ∙ ,( ∙ %ℎ',(,
+ !
8
∙ +ℎ,(, ∙ %ℎ',(, + !9 ∙ +ℎ,(, ∙ ,( ∙ %ℎ',(,
+ !, + 0,1 
( 3 ) 
Return is the quarterly firm stock return adjusted by the value-weighted market return. Buyhold 
is an indicator if the investor's quarter end shares were greater than or equal to the previous 
quarter. Search is an indicator if the institutional investor searched for firm information on 
EDGAR during the quarter.19,20 The main coefficient of interest is β9. If β9 is positive and 
significant, then EDGAR research is more informative to local investors’ portfolio decisions than 
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 I do not include firm-time fixed effects because of perfect correlation with the dependent variable. In robustness 
tests, I find that results are similar using a firm fixed effect. 
 
20
 I use an indicator variable in place of prior proxies for information acquisition for ease of interpreting results. 
Conclusions are identical using other measures of information acquisition. 
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non-local investors. To test this, I manually match EDGAR professional investors to their 13(f) 
portfolio holdings on Thomson Reuters. I link EDGAR names to Thomson Reuters’ names using 
two steps. First, I look through each candidate name match based on high name similarity. 
Second, I manually search through Thomson Reuters’ names for common firms on EDGAR that 
do not match in the previous step.21 This results in matching 609 institutions to the EDGAR 
research data. In instances where an institutional investor has multiple locations searching on 
EDGAR (i.e., multiple branches), I assign the most frequent location to that institutional 
investor.22 
 For the same sample of professional investors with 13(f) holdings, I investigate if “Local 
Bias” is related to the amount of public information acquired (H3):  
 %,, =  2 ∙ , + 23 ∙ ,, + 24 ∙ , ∙ ,,  +  
, + 
, +  ,, ( 4 ) 
Where PB is one of two measures of portfolio bias as of the end of the calendar quarter. The first 
measure, PB1, is the difference between the investor’s portfolio weight in stock i and the market 
portfolio weight in stock i. PB2 is the log of the investor’s portfolio weight in stock i divided by 
the market portfolio weight in stock i (Cooper et al. 2012). If γ2 and γ3 are insignificantly 
different from zero, then γ1 represents the previously documented “Local Bias” in portfolio 
holdings. If γ3 is positive and significant, then “Local Bias” is larger when investors acquire 
public information, consistent with public information acting as a contributing force to “Local 
Bias” (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009). 
The above specifications result in the formulation of three distinct samples. The first 
sample, which I label the Primary Sample, is associated with testing equation (1). The second 
                                                 
21
 I define high name similarity using SAS’ compged function being less than 500. I define common firms as the top 
200 most frequent firms in EDGAR that do not match based on high similarity. 
 
22
 Results are robust to assigning the zip code location used on the investors’ 13(f) filing.  
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sample, associated with testing equation (2), is labeled the Delay Sample. The third sample, 
associated with testing equations (3) and (4), is labeled the 13(f) Sample. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS 
4.1 Tests of Hypothesis 1 – Proximity and Public Information Acquisition 
4.1.1 Main Analysis 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the Primary Sample. The sample has 
6,624,370 investor-firm quarters. In about 10 percent of these observations, the investor is within 
100 kilometers of the firm. The mean number of kilobytes requested each quarter for a firm was 
about 535. For perspective, the median byte size for form 10-K in the sample is 225 kilobytes. 
The average number of files downloaded for the first time in a quarter by an EDGAR user for a 
specific company is 0.89, with 0.81 redownloaded files. The correlations presented in Panel B of 
Table 2 provide initial evidence that Local tends to be positively related to measures of 
information acquisition, suggesting that the closer an investor is to an investment, the more 
information they acquire about that investment. 
Table 3 presents results from estimating equation (1) for each of the measures of public 
information acquisition. Consistent with the correlations, Local is positively related to public 
information acquisition. In other words, the same investor, with both a local and non-local 
investment, prefers to acquire more information about local investments. On average, investors 
tend to acquire 20.16% more kilobytes of information, 5.83% more previously unseen files, and 
redownload 7.36% more files if they are within 100 kilometers of the investment. Using the 
mean value of the total bytes acquired each quarter (SumSize) from Table 2, this suggests that 
being proximate to an investment results in about 107 additional kilobytes of information being 
acquired for a company each quarter. This is roughly equivalent to a single investor requesting 
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about 6 more material disclosures (i.e., 8-Ks) for one company every quarter or about 5 more 
annual reports (i.e., 10-Ks) over the lifetime of the investor-firm relationship.23 These results are 
consistent with predictions that investors will acquire more public information for local 
investments (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009).24 In untabulated analyses, I find that the 
research by local investors tends to be particularly concentrated around informational events, 
which is consistent with their increased research being information and trade-based. 
 To investigate how pervasive investors’ preferences are to acquire more local 
information, I look at cross-sectional variation in investor behavior based on the filing type being 
requested. It is possible that proximity is only related to increased acquisition of certain company 
filings, such as annual or quarterly reports. I explore this possibility by looking at investors that 
acquired at least some information during the quarter. Table 4 presents estimates of Equation (1) 
using InitialDownloads for groups of filings provided to the SEC. Forms are categorized into one 
of the following seven form categories: (1) Annual Reports, (2) Quarterly Reports, (3) IPO 
Reports, (4) Material Disclosures, (5) Insider Trading Reports, (6) Proxy Statements, or (7) 
Other Forms.25 The first noteworthy result is that acquisition of information for each type of 
information is positively related to an investor’s proximity to investment. Interestingly, the 
relation between proximity and information acquisition is the smallest for annual and quarterly 
reports. The relation between proximity and public information acquisition seems to be strongest 
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 The median 8-K and 10-K byte size in the sample is about 18 and 225 kilobytes respectively. 
 
24
 Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) characterizes investors’ information acquisition choice in their 
proposition two. In addition to predicting that investors will learn more about local investments, this proposition 
highlights that investors have incentives to learn about (1) larger risk factors, and (2) risk factors for which the 
average investor is uncertain. In untabulated analyses, I find evidence consistent with these additional predictions. 
Specifically, investors acquire more public information for larger and more volatile investments. 
 
25
 The specific forms associated with each category is as follows: (1) 10-Ks, (2) 10-Qs, (3) S1s, (4) 8-Ks, (5) Forms 
4, 5, 6, (6) DEF Forms, or (7) Other. For more detail on each form category, please refer to 
https://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/forms/edgform.pdf.  
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amongst material disclosures and insider trading reports. Being local to an investment is related 
to increased information acquisition of material disclosures and insider trading reports by 6.71% 
and 10.42%, respectively. This evidence suggests that the relation between proximity to 
investment and information acquisition permeates across information types, but that there is 
variation in the strength of the relation between information types. Additionally, if local 
investors do have an information advantage, it seems that it is likely to be derived from their 
increased use of material news and insider trading information. 
I perform a second cross-sectional split based on the length of the investor-firm 
relationship in Table 5. One concern is that local investors’ preference for additional public 
information might be transient and only exist at the onset of the investor-firm relationship. If 
asymmetric information acquisition does not persist, then this would be generally inconsistent 
with local investors having a consistent information advantage. In contrast to this concern, 
results in Table 5 suggest that investors’ preferences are actually increasing throughout the 
investor-firm relationship. Across all four measures of information acquisition, I find that a 
longer investor-firm relationship increases investors’ preference to acquire more public 
information for local stocks. This finding is consistent with the view that investors obtain private 
information through strong and established relationships and community ties to local firms (e.g., 
Coval and Moskowitz, 2001).  
4.1.2 Exogenous Shock to Investor Proximity: 
 Deciding to use EDGAR as a source for firm information and selecting firms to follow 
are both choices made by investors. It is possible that professional investors using EDGAR are 
not a representative sample of the investor population or that other reasons lead an investor to 
both select firms and request information. Possible selection biases or correlated omitted 
 25 
variables could result in observing a positive relation between investor proximity and 
information acquisition. To address these concerns, I exploit plausibly exogenous variation in 
investor proximity to a firm resulting from changes in firm headquarter location after investors 
select to follow a firm. 
According to extant academic research (Strauss-Kahn and Vives, 2009), firms decide to 
move headquarter locations based on strategic incentives regarding lower taxes, lower employee 
wages, and better airport facilities. It seems reasonable to assume that any given investor’s 
preference for proximity is immaterial in executives’ decision criteria to move a firm’s 
headquarters and the location selected. This assumption is reinforced by the fact that firm 
investors are geographically spread across the country, with each investor possibly vying for 
proximity to the firm. 
 To implement this research design, I identify changes in firm headquarter locations using 
changes in the zip code of a firm’s business address listed on their annual and quarterly filings. I 
only select firms who change zip code locations once during my sample period and who move 
more than 100 kilometers away from their initial location. I further exclude firms for which the 
zip code switches back and forth between two locations. With this set of firms, I structure a 
simple difference-in-differences research design, where previously untreated (i.e., non-local) 
investors are arguably “randomly” treated with proximity.  
 Table 6 presents the findings of this difference-in-differences research design using the 
eight quarters before and after firms move headquarters. I further include investor-firm fixed 
effects, which controls for fixed biases and incentives that may have motivated an investor to 
follow and research about a firm. The combination of these fixed effects, along with firm-time 
fixed effects subsumes both difference-in-differences main effect indicators for the post period 
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(Post) and being treated with proximity (Treat). Table 6 shows that for each of the proxies for 
public information acquisition, being treated with proximity results in increased information 
acquisition, relative to professional investors who remained untreated. 26 Collectively, these tests 
add further evidence that, irrespective of endogenous selection, proximity to investment 
increases investors’ likelihood of acquiring public information (H1). 
4.2 Test of Hypothesis 2 - Value of Information Acquisition for Local vs Non-local Investors: 
 The prior analyses suggest that investors prefer local information and that their 
preference is consistent with them having a private information advantage in local stocks. I next 
test whether public information is more valuable to local or non-local investors using two 
approaches: (1) enhanced timeliness tests and (2) improved portfolio decision-making tests.  
4.2.1 Enhanced Timeliness of Access: 
 Using the Delay Sample, I investigate whether investors acquire local or non-local 
information more rapidly. The average delay in information retrieval by professional investors 
over the two-day period after the release of the filing is 7.57 hours. The average delay in 
information retrieval over a 60-minute period is around 6.7 minutes. Table 7 presents results for 
investors that acquire information in a 48-hour period as well as a 60-minute period following 
the release of the filing. I find evidence that over a 48-hour period, the same investor arrives 
about 30 minutes more rapidly to local information compared to non-local information. Over a 
60-minute period, I find that investors acquire local information about 1 minute more rapidly 
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 One concern is that changes in familiarity, rather than private information access, play a role in investors’ 
information acquisition response. I discuss familiarity more generally in subsequent robustness tests. In this specific 
setting, familiarity concerns are mitigated for three reasons. First, investors already knew and searched for the firm 
before the change in headquarters and should therefore already be familiar with the firm. Second, changes in 
headquarters are typically announced well in advance of the actual move. As such, familiarity effects for “treated” 
investors should appear in the pre-headquarter change period, minimizing the likelihood of observing a post-
treatment effect. Third, in untabulated analyses I find that the treatment effect is larger for investors that had 
followed the firm for a longer period of time. These investors are arguably highly familiar with the firm, and should 
have a reduced treatment effect if the treatment effect were capturing changes in familiarity.  
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than non-local information. For the average investor in the 60-minute window this time 
advantage equates to approximately a 12.7% reduction from the average. These results suggest 
that investors derive value from local information. 
 One concern with this analysis is that west coast investors might be asleep when east 
coast disclosures are made, or alternatively east coast investors are no longer working when west 
coast disclosures are made. If this is the case, then a time-zone effect might explain the above 
findings. The analysis focusing on the hour following the disclosure release helps mitigate this 
concern, but to more fully rule out a mechanical relation, I perform an additional robustness 
check. In untabulated analyses, I find similar results when only focusing on disclosures made 
between the hours of 11:00 am and 5:00 pm EST. These hours of disclosure represent the period 
of time where both east coast and west coast investors are awake and likely working. As such, 
the enhanced timeliness of local investors in acquiring newly released disclosures does not seem 
to be coming from a mechanical time-zone effect. 
4.2.2 Improved Decision Making: 
 Using the 13(f) Sample, I test whether the value of public information varies by investors’ 
proximity to investment. Table 8 presents descriptive statistics on this sample. The median 
investment in a firm by institutional investors in this sample is $2.6 million. On average 
institutional investors perform EDGAR research for approximately 21% of their invested stocks. 
Roughly 8% of investments are local to institutional investors. Table 9 presents tests on 
improved decision-making. In columns (1) and (3) we see that research on EDGAR is associated 
with increased decision-making ability for institutional investors. Specifically, institutions’ buy 
and sell decisions tend to be approximately 27 basis points more profitable when coupled with 
public information acquisition. In columns (2) and (4), we see that research on EDGAR for local 
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firms is incrementally more informative relative to non-local firms. We can interpret column (4) 
results as the same investor deriving more portfolio value from researching local stocks than 
non-local stocks, with the order of magnitude being approximately 54 basis points. The 
combination of these results and the timeliness results suggest that investors value public 
information more for local investments. 
4.3 Test of Hypothesis 3 – “Local Bias” and Public Information Acquisition: 
  I next test whether “Local Bias” is related to the amount of public information acquired. 
Table 10 helps us better understand the forces involved. The first noteworthy result in Table 10 
is that, across both proxies for portfolio bias, investors exhibit “Local Bias.” At the individual 
stock level, local stocks tend to be 0.069% larger in investors’ portfolios relative to the market 
portfolio. Secondly, we see that investors’ “Local Bias” is increasing in the amount of public 
information acquired, consistent with public information being a contributing force to “Local 
Bias.” In terms of magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in public information acquisition 
(Factor) is associated with a 0.054% increase in “Local Bias.” In untabulated robustness tests, I 
find that altering the empirical design yields similar results. Specifically, including the lagged 
level of bias produces similar results. Additionally, including an investor-firm fixed effect, which 
forces variation to exist intertemporally for the investor-firm pair, yields similar results. These 
results corroborate the theory in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) which predicts that 
public information acquisition plays a contributing role in investors’ “Local Bias.” 
4.4 Robustness of Empirical Results: 
4.4.1 Investment Level Control: 
One concern with some of the preceding analyses is whether the results are being driven 
by a correlated omitted variable related to the degree of investment in the company. In other 
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words, investors research more for stocks that make up a larger portion of their portfolio. To 
address this concern, I use the 13(f) Sample and estimate equations (1), (2), (3), and (4) including 
the level of investment as an additional control variable. Table 11 presents the coefficients of 
interest from each of the equations after including the level of past investment. Corroborating the 
initial concern, I find that the amount previously invested by the institutional investor is 
positively related to public information acquisition. Of greater importance for this paper, 
investors’ preference to acquire local information is still positive and significant (H1). 
Furthermore, controlling for the amount previously invested does not change inferences 
regarding local information being more valuable for portfolio decision (H2). Lastly, the relation 
between portfolio bias and public information acquisition is unaffected (H3). 
4.4.2 Familiarity Bias: 
 Familiarity bias is a behavioral bias of wanting to own investments with which an 
investor is familiar (Huberman, 2001). Importantly, it does not represent an information 
advantage in local stocks. A potential concern is whether familiarity bias or a prior private 
information advantage is the driving force behind the documented findings. In an attempt to 
address this concern, I highlight five points. First, the data represents research by an investor for 
a firm and therefore suggests that the investor is already familiar with the investment opportunity 
being researched (i.e., they know it exists). Second, to the extent that familiarity is a firm fixed 
effect, similar to visibility, the research design controls for this type of variation. Third, in 
looking at the first quarter an investor researched on EDGAR for a firm, arguably a time of 
similar familiarity for local and non-local investments, I find that investors still research more for 
local investments. Fourth, prior robustness tests that control for past investment should 
simultaneously control for the degree of familiarity since research suggests “familiarity breeds 
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investment.” Fifth, since familiarity bias is unrelated to information advantages it would not 
explain why public information for local stocks is more valuable to investors’ portfolio 
decisions. Collectively, these arguments suggest the evidence in this paper is more consistent 
with prior private information advantages motivating investors to acquire additional public 
information. 
4.4.2 Controlling for Relative Wealth Hedging: 
Some of the documented findings are consistent with relative wealth hedging as well as 
asymmetric information advantages.27 Using a model, Garcia and Strobl (2011) concludes if 
agents have incentives to “catch up with the Joneses,” then agents will herd on acquiring the 
same information. To the extent that local stocks hedge relative wealth concerns, this theory 
suggests that investors will acquire more information about proximate investments. If this were 
the driving force behind the documented asymmetric public information acquisition, then there 
should be an increased incentive for investors to acquire local information if neighboring 
investors also acquire local firm information (i.e., herding on information). In untabulated 
analyses, I find that herding is unrelated to the documented local effect. Specifically, investors’ 
preference to acquire more public information for local investments is not increasing in the 
amount of other proximate investors searching for the same firm.  
4.4.3 Information Asymmetry: 
 The main analyses find that investors acquire more public information for local 
investments and that public information tends to be more valuable to local investors. In 
combination, this suggests that having additional local investors requesting public information 
should expand firm-level information asymmetries. I look at firm-level information asymmetry 
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 Evidence surrounding relative wealth effects contributing to home bias are mixed. For example, Massa and 
Simonov (2006) conclude that home bias is not explained by nonfinancial income. 
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on public disclosures dates to confirm this line of reasoning. Using disclosure dates on EDGAR, 
I evaluate if having local investors access the disclosed filing increases firm-level information 
asymmetry. Since firms often make multiple disclosures in a calendar quarter, I use a firm-time 
fixed effect to control for fixed firm-level information environment attributes. Table 12 presents 
the findings of this analysis. In columns (1) through (4), I find that information asymmetry is 
higher when local investors access the public filing. Column (2) includes stock turnover and 
stock return to control for attributes specific to the news event that may attract more local 
investors. Columns (3) and (4) include disclosure type fixed effects to further control for the 
nature of the news being disclosed. Across each of these specifications, I find consistent 
evidence that having local investors access a disclosed filing tends to be associated with 
increased firm-level information asymmetry.28 
4.4.4 Non-Professional Investors: 
I explore the generalizability of results to non-professional investors. It’s possible that 
other investor groups behave contrary to the consistently documented behavior. For example, 
retail investors might have investment objectives or risk tolerances that are different from 
professional investors. These differences could alter preferences to acquire more public 
information for local or non-local firms. It is also possible that non-professional investors tend to 
receive a different amount or type of private local information, which may also manifest in 
changes in information acquisition behavior. I attempt to address this element of generalizability 
through the use of non-professional investors’ search on EDGAR. Non-professional investors are 
all EDGAR users who do not own the IP address from which they are searching, and instead 
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 These findings are generally robust to changes in measurement and research design. Results hold (1) using the 
percentage of investors that are local instead of an indicator variable for the presence of local investors, (2) including 
a control for the number of investors accessing the filing, (3) relaxing the fixed effects structure, and (4) using an 
alternative measure of information asymmetry based on bid-ask spread. 
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receive an IP address through an Internet Service Provider. These investors are more likely to be 
retail investors, but could also capture smaller-sized professional investors or even non-investor 
financial statement users. I use this sample of investors in untabulated analyses. I find that these 
EDGAR users continue to exhibit a preference to acquire more public information for local 
investments.  
4.4.5 Alternative Measure of Proximity: 
The entire set of analyses pivot around the geodesic proximity between investors and 
investments (i.e. as a crow flies). This focus is important given the literature on “Local Bias.” I 
step back from this focus temporarily to explore whether information acquisition behavior 
responds similarly to variation in the travel time between investors and firms. This measure is 
based on the time it takes to travel between two locations and is an indicator set to one if the 
duration of the optimal travel itinerary is less than or equal to two hours (Short Travel). This 
measure comes from prior literature that uses estimates of travel time by car and plane between 
locations and selects the optimal travel pattern in a given period of time (Giroud, 2013; Bernstein 
et al., 2016).29 In addition to proximity, this measure also captures elements of economic 
distance. Travel time between two locations encompasses the economic cost of monitoring a firm 
as well as the cost of maintaining firm relationships. Table 12 presents empirical findings for 
equation (1) as it relates to this measure of proximity. Similar to prior results, public information 
acquisition is increasing in proximity. 
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 Refer to the Appendix for additional details on the construction and measurement of this variable. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
It is often posited that investors have a private information advantage in local stocks, 
which causes them to overweight local stocks in their investment portfolio (i.e., “Local Bias”). I 
investigate the role of public information for local and non-local investor. This paper asks the 
following three questions: First, do investors mitigate their information disadvantage by 
acquiring more public information for non-local stocks (i.e., level the playing field) or do they 
maximize their information advantage by acquiring more public information for local stocks 
(i.e., widen the gap)? Second, does the value of public information vary by an investor’s 
proximity to investment? Third, does public information consumption mitigate or moderate 
investors’ “Local Bias?” 
The body of evidence in this study suggests that investors use public information to 
widen their local information advantage. Using a novel dataset of professional investors’ 
requests on EDGAR, a repository for all publicly filed financial disclosures with the SEC, I find 
that investors choose to acquire more information for local investments. For example, each 
quarter investors access 20.16% more kilobytes of information if they are within 100 kilometers 
of the investment. For the average investor in this sample, being proximate to an investment is 
roughly equivalent to requesting about 6 additional material disclosures (i.e., 8-K’s) for that 
company in one quarter. These inferences are robust to variations in research design, sample 
selection, and measurement. For a sample of non-local investors, I show that when investors are 
exogenously “treated” with proximity because of changes in firm headquarter location, they 
increase their public information consumption.
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I next show that public information is more valuable to local investors using two 
approaches. First, I show that in both the two days and one hour following the release of public 
information, investors tend to acquire local information more rapidly than non-local information. 
This enhanced speed may afford investors the opportunity to act on the information more rapidly 
and suggests that investors value the timeliness of public information more for local than non-
local investments. As a second test of value, I show that local investors’ share purchase decisions 
are more positively correlated with future returns when coupled with public information 
acquisition. In tandem, these findings suggest that public information is more valuable to local 
investors. 
I lastly test whether “Local Bias” in stock ownership varies with the amount of public 
information acquired. If public information acquisition is a contributing force, then additional 
public information should enhance investors’ “Local Bias.” Consistent with prior literature, I 
show that the institutional investors in my sample exhibit “Local Bias.” More importantly, I find 
that investors’ “Local Bias” is increasing in the amount of public information acquired about 
local firms. This evidence corroborates prior findings that “Local Bias” is related to information 
asymmetries, and further suggests that public information plays a contributing role. 
Admittedly, these analyses are subject to important caveats. While the documented 
findings are quite robust, it is possible that these relations are not generalizable to investors who 
do not use EDGAR as a source for firm information. Additionally, omitted variable bias 
concerns may persist, so long as those explanations are unrelated to investor or firm attributes. 
While acknowledging these concerns and caveats, this paper provides consistent results that 
proximity to investment is positively related to information retrieval, that public information 
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tends to be more valuable to local investors, and that public information enhances investors’ 
“Local Bias.” 
In closing, I anticipate the identification and use of professional investor requests for 
financial information to be valuable to future research initiatives. I expect future work 
investigating information acquisition at the investor level to be very fruitful given the 
combination of granular investor data on information retrieval and the importance of 
understanding the value of information disclosed. 
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APPENDIX 1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENT 
  
Variable Description
Abn_Return The quarterly firm stock return adjusted by the value-weighted 
market return. 
Buyhold An indicator if the institutional investor's quarter end shares were 
greater than or equal to the previous quarter end shares. 
Factor The principal component of InitialDownloads , SumSize , and 
Redownloads . 
 Illiquidity
The natural log of the Amihud price impact of trade measured on 
the release date of the EDGAR filing (Amihud, 2002). The price 
impact of trade is calculated as the absolute value of the firm 
stock return divided by the volume of dollars traded.
InitialDownloads The number of files downloaded for the first time by that investor.
Local
An indicator if the geodesic distance in miles between the 
investor’s IP address location and the firm’s headquarters (i.e. as 
the crow flies) is less than or equal to 100 miles.
Local Investors An indicator for the EDGAR filing being accessed by a local 
professional investor on the release date. 
PB1 The difference between investor portfolio weight in stock i  and 
the market portfolio weight for stock i times 100.
PB2 The log of the investor portfolio weight in stock i divided by the 
market portfolio weight in stock i .
Redownloads The number of files redownloaded (i.e. requested for the second 
time or more).
Relationship Age Length of monitoring, in quarters, of the firm by the investor.
Retrieval Delay
The difference in minutes between the investors retrieval time of 
the filing and the time at which the filing was released. Since the 
exact time of day in which the filing was released is unknown, the 
time of the first viewer is used as a proxy.
Return The firm stock return on the release date of the EDGAR filing.
Search An indicator if the institutional investor searched for firm 
information on EDGAR during the quarter.
Short Travel
An indicator if the number of minutes needed to optimally travel 
between the investor’s IP address location and the firm’s 
headquarters (Giroud, 2013) is less than two hours.
SumSize The aggregate kilobyte size for all files downloaded for the first 
time.
Turnover The natural log of the volume of shares traded divided by the 
shares outstanding on the release date of the EDGAR filing. 
 37 
Calculation of Short Travel: 
 I preform similar steps to Giroud (2013) to obtain the optimal travel itinerary between 
two locations. The following 5 steps describe this process. (1) Obtain flight routes and their 
respective travel duration data from the T-100 Domestic Segment Database. (2) Construct a 
database of optimal flight itineraries between any two locations, with a maximum number of 5 
flights in sequence. (3) Obtain estimates of travel time by car via API requests from Bing Maps. 
These requests include travel time estimates between investors and companies as well as travel 
time to their nearby airports.30 (4) Create a database of possible travel plans for each investor-
firm combination (i.e. driving only vs. driving to a nearby airport and flying to an airport nearby 
the firm).31 (5) Identify the fastest travel itinerary for the investor-firm combination.32  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 Airport zip code location is obtained from the FAA: http://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_safety/airportdata_5010/ 
31
 Nearby airports are defined as the five closest airports to the zip code and all airports within 200 miles. 
32
 Following Giroud (2013), 60 minutes is added to the flight itineraries for checking in baggage. Additionally, 60 
minutes is added for each layover.  
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Figure 1A: United States Zip Codes with Professional Investors using EDGAR 
 
 
Figure 1B: United States Zip codes with Firm Headquarters 
 
25
30
35
40
45
50
-120 -100 -80
Longitude
La
tit
ud
e
25
30
35
40
45
50
-120 -100 -80
Longitude
La
tit
ud
e
  
 
 
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Number of Investors 1,720 2,714 2,687 2,330 2,580 2,910 3,171 3,048 2,938 3,019 2,844 2,732 1,926
Number of Firms
25
48
39
33
27
27
18,067.04
446
143
73
51
Panel A. Top 10 Most Research Active Professional Investor Firms
Investor Firm
Notes: This table presents the most common professional investor firms using EDGAR (Panel A), the most common cities for professional investor firms using EDGAR (Panel B), and 
the time-series pattern in the number of professional investors using EDGAR (Panel C). Average Research in a Quarter  is the average number of total filings requested by the 
professional investor firm each quarter. Professional investor firms are made up of several professional investors.
Table 1. Professional Investor Descriptive Statistics
Jersey City, NJ
City, State
San Francisco, CA
Los Angeles, CA
Panel B: Top 10 Most Frequent Cities for Professional Investor Firms
Washington, DC
Average Research in a Quarter
New York, NY
Atlanta, GA
Chicago, IL
Boston, MA
Minneapolis, MN
Greenwich, CT
11,648.66
9,023.53
7,360.39
7,922.88
Panel C: Time Series Patterns in the Number of Investors Using EDGAR
JP MORGAN
CITIGRP
UBS
BANK OF AMERICA
WACHOVIA
MORGAN STANLEY
MERRILL LYNCH
DEUTSCHE BANK
WELLS FARGO
DEAN WITTER
6,530.31
6,509.14
6,296.57
7,122.00
21,570.10
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Q1 Median Mean Q3 Std Dev. Obs
0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.30 6,624,370
0.00 0.00 534.60 258.22 1,488.20 6,624,370
0.00 0.00 0.89 1.00 1.87 6,624,370
0.00 0.00 0.81 0.00 3.16 6,624,370
-1.09 -1.09 0.00 1.01 1.52 6,624,370
3.00 7.00 8.84 12.00 7.64 6,624,370
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7)
Local (1) 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.025 -0.002
SumSize (2) 0.020 0.952 0.489 0.603 -0.100
InitialDownloads (3) 0.030 0.531 0.546 0.823 -0.059
Redownloads (4) 0.029 0.320 0.532 0.590 0.015
Factor (5) 0.025 0.603 0.823 0.590 -0.105
Relationship Age (7) -0.002 -0.100 -0.059 0.015 -0.105
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Primary Sample
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics on proximity and public information acquisition using quarterly data on 
investor-company pairs. The sample starts in the first quarter of 2003 and ends in the first quarter of 2015. Panel A 
presents summary statistics. Panel B presents Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) correlation 
statistics. Local  is an indicator if the geodesic distance between the investor’s IP address location and the firm’s 
headquarters (i.e. as the crow flies) is less than or equal to 100 kilometers. SumSize  is the aggregate kilobyte size for 
all files downloaded for the first time. InitialDownloads  is the number of files downloaded for the first time. 
Redownloads  represents the number of files redownloaded. Factor  is the principal component of SumSize, 
InitialDownloads, and Redownloads.  Variables are not logged to preserve interpretability. Relationship Age  is the 
length of monitoring, in quarters, of the firm by the investor.
Panel B. Correlation Statistics
Panel A. Summary Statistics
Local
InitialDownloads
SumSize
Redownloads
Factor
Relationship Age
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coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value
Local 0.184 7.629 0.000 0.057 7.126 0.000 0.071 8.625 0.000 0.154 7.964 0.000
Investor x Year-qtr FE
Firm x Year-qtr FE
R-squared
Obs
Notes: This table presents the relation between public information acquisition and investors' proximity to investment. Local  is 
an indicator if the geodesic distance between the investor’s IP address location and the firm’s headquarters (i.e. as the crow 
flies) is less than or equal to 100 kilometers. SumSize  is the aggregate kilobyte size for all files downloaded for the first time. 
InitialDownloads  is the number of files downloaded for the first time. Redownloads  represents the number of files 
redownloaded. Factor  is the principal component of SumSize, InitialDownloads, and Redownloads.  All continuous 
variables are logged to reduce the influence of outliers. Standard errors are clustered by Investor and Firm.
Yes
6,624,3706,624,370 6,624,370 6,624,370
0.2250.255 0.176 0.245
Table 3. Relation between Public Information Acquisition and Investors' Proximity to Investment
Factor
Yes YesYes
Yes
Yes
InitialDownloads RedownloadsSumSize
Yes Yes
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Form Type coeff t-stat p-value R-squared Obs
Annual Reports 0.010 4.919 0.000 0.167 906,207
Quarterly Reports 0.012 5.499 0.000 0.154 1,012,412
IPO Reports 0.018 4.002 0.000 0.306 198,771
Material Disclosures 0.065 6.836 0.000 0.208 676,763
Insider Trading Reports 0.099 6.227 0.000 0.544 62,459
Proxy Statements 0.014 4.394 0.000 0.360 212,265
Other Forms 0.089 3.995 0.000 0.261 643,233
Yes
Yes
Investor x Year-qtr FE
Firm x Year-qtr FE
Notes: This table presents cross-sectional results of how the filing type requested relates to an investors 
inclination to research more for local stocks. Local is an indicator if the geodesic distance between the 
investor’s IP address location and the firm’s headquarters (i.e. as the crow flies) is less than or equal to 100 
kilometers. InitialDownloads  is the number of files downloaded for the first time by that investor.  All 
continuous variables are logged to reduce the influence of outliers. Standard errors are clustered by Investor 
and Firm.
Lo
ca
l
InitialDownloads
Table 4. Relation between Public Information Acquisition and Investors' Proximity to Investment by 
Information Type Requested
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coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value
Local 0.135 6.880 0.000 0.039 6.770 0.000 0.038 5.458 0.000 0.098 6.711 0.000
Relationship Age -0.036 -18.981 0.000 -0.005 -14.363 0.000 0.002 5.798 0.000 -0.010 -10.952 0.000
Local x Relationship Age 0.009 4.260 0.000 0.003 4.596 0.000 0.004 5.415 0.000 0.008 4.951 0.000
Investor x Year-qtr FE
Firm x Year-qtr FE
R-squared
Obs
YesYes Yes Yes
Table 5. Cross-Sectional Variation in the Relation between Public Information Acquisition and 
Investors' Proximity to Investment: Relationship Age
InitialDownloadsSumSize Redownloads Factor
YesYes Yes Yes
0.2270.258 0.177 0.246
6,624,3706,624,370 6,624,370 6,624,370
Notes: This table presents cross-sectional results of how the strength of the investor-firm relationship relates to an investor's inclination to 
research more for local stocks. Local  is an indicator if the geodesic distance between the investor’s IP address location and the firm’s 
headquarters (i.e. as the crow flies) is less than or equal to 100 kilometers. InitialDownloads  is the number of files downloaded for the 
first time. SumSize  is the aggregate kilobyte size for all files downloaded for the first time. Redownloads  represents the number of files 
redownloaded. Factor  is the principal component of SumSize, InitialDownloads, and Redownload. Relationship Age  is the length of 
monitoring, in quarters, of the firm by the investor, where the first quarter takes a value of zero. Standard errors are clustered by Investor 
and Firm. 
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coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value
Post x Treat 0.133 2.063 0.039 0.038 2.775 0.006 0.034 2.214 0.027 0.094 2.624 0.009
Investor x Firm FE
Firm x Year-qtr FE
R-squared
Obs
Notes: This table compares investors' public information acquisition surrounding exogenous changes in proximity to 
investment using a simple difference-in-differences setup. Each of the included investors are initially non-local, with 
certain investors becoming local as a result of changes in firm headquarter locations. Post x Treat  equals one if the 
geodesic distance between the investor’s IP address location and the firm’s headquarters (i.e. as the crow flies) is less 
than or equal to 100 kilometers. SumSize  is the aggregate kilobyte size for all files downloaded for the first time. 
InitialDownloads  is the number of files downloaded for the first time. Redownloads  represents the number of files 
redownloaded. Factor  is the principal component of SumSize, InitialDownloads, and Redownload.  Standard 
errors are clustered by Investor and Firm. 
Table 6. Relation between Public Information Acquisition and Investors' Proximity to Investment 
Using Changes in Firm Headquarters
0.315
476,135476,135 476,135
InitialDownloadsSumSize Redownloads
YesYes Yes
0.295
476,135
0.279
Factor
Yes
0.322
YesYes Yes Yes
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coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value
Local -29.488 -3.981 0.000 -0.852 -4.974 0.000
Investor x Year-qtr FE
Firm x Year-qtr FE
R-squared
Obs
Table 7. Relation between the Delay in Public Information Retrieval and 
Investors' Proximity to Investment
Notes: This table evaluates whether investors acquire public disclosures more rapidly based on 
their proximity to investment. Local  is an indicator if the geodesic distance between the investor’s 
IP address location and the firm’s headquarters (i.e. as the crow flies) is less than or equal to 100 
kilometers. Retrieval Delay is the difference in minutes between the investor's retrieval time of the 
filing and the time at which the filing was released. Since the exact time of day in which the filing 
was released is unknown, the time of the first viewer is used as a proxy. All standard errors are 
clustered by Investor and Firm.
Yes
Yes
0.310
410,884
Retrieval Delay
48 Hours 1 Hour
0.242
975,034
Yes
Yes
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Q1 Median Mean Q3 Std Dev. Obs
Local 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.27 2,120,687
Search 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.41 2,120,687
Buyhold 0.00 1.00 0.57 1.00 0.50 1,918,475
Abn_Return -0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.08 0.15 1,913,998
PB1 -0.04 0.00 0.26 0.03 0.03 1,946,397
PB2 -1.79 -0.47 -0.62 0.62 2.27 1,946,385
Investment ($ Millions) 0.44 2.57 53.30 15.28 343.69 1,913,998
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics using quarterly data on investor-company 
pairs for the sample of institutional investors with identifiable search data on EDGAR. 
Local  is an indicator if the geodesic distance between the investor’s IP address location 
and the firm’s headquarters (i.e. as the crow flies) is less than or equal to 100 kilometers. 
Search  is an indicator if the institutional investor searched for firm information on EDGAR 
during the quarter. Buyhold  is an indicator if the institutional investor's quarter end shares 
were greater than or equal to the previous quarter. Abn_Return  is the quarterly firm stock 
return adjusted by the value-weighted market return. PB1  is the difference between 
investor's portfolio weight in stock i and the market portfolio weight for stock i times 100. 
PB2  is the log of the investor's portfolio weight in stock i divided by the market portfolio 
weight in stock i. Investment is the dollar value the institutional investor has invested in the 
given firm.
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for the 13(f) Sample
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coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value
Buyhold t -0.001 -2.002 0.045 -0.001 -1.980 0.048 -0.002 -2.394 0.017 -0.002 -2.350 0.019
Search t 0.001 0.616 0.538 0.001 0.881 0.379 0.001 0.666 0.506 0.001 0.891 0.374
Buyhold t  x Search t 0.003 2.310 0.021 0.002 1.824 0.068 0.003 2.921 0.004 0.002 2.718 0.007
Local t -0.001 -0.694 0.488 -0.001 -0.630 0.529
Buyhold t  x Local t 0.000 0.124 0.902 0.000 0.118 0.906
Search t  x Local t -0.003 -1.518 0.129 -0.002 -1.067 0.286
Buyhold t  x Search t  x Local t 0.007 2.903 0.004 0.005 2.446 0.015
Abn_Return t -0.042 -4.478 0.000 -0.042 -4.476 0.000 -0.047 -5.077 0.000 -0.047 -5.076 0.000
Abn_Return t-1 -0.062 -9.615 0.000 -0.062 -9.616 0.000 -0.030 -4.760 0.000 -0.030 -4.761 0.000
Investor x Year-qtr FE
R-squared
Obs
0.008 0.008 0.052 0.052
No No Yes Yes
Table 9. Public Information Acquisition and Informed Trading
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Abn_Return t+1
1,557,520 1,556,741 1,556,741
Notes: This table presents the value of public information for portfolio decisions, where a higher correlation between purchases and future returns 
suggests increased value. Abn_Return is the quarterly firm stock return adjusted by the value-weighted market return. Buyhold  is an indicator if 
the institutional investor's quarter end shares were greater than or equal to the previous quarter. Search  is an indicator if the institutional investor 
searched for firm information on EDGAR during the quarter. Local is an indicator if the the geodesic distance between the investor’s IP address 
location and the firm’s headquarters (i.e. as the crow flies) is less than or equal to 100 kilometers. Standard errors are clustered by Investor and 
Firm.
1,557,520
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coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value
Local 0.069 2.254 0.025 0.069 2.113 0.035 0.136 2.457 0.014 0.114 2.264 0.024
Factor 0.045 5.365 0.000 0.184 13.660 0.000
Local x Factor 0.054 2.232 0.026 0.073 3.206 0.001
Investor x Year-qtr FE
Firm x Year-qtr FE
R-squared
Obs
Table 10. Relation between Local Bias and Public Information Acquistion
YesYes
PB1 PB2
Yes Yes
Yes YesYes Yes
0.472 0.412
1,945,672
Notes: This table presents the relation between local bias and public information acquisition. PB1  and PB2  are measures of 
portfolio bias. PB1  is the difference between the investor’s portfolio weight in stock i  and the market portfolio weight in stock 
i . PB2 is the log of the investor’s portfolio weight in stock i  divided by the market portfolio weight in stock i . Local  is an 
indicator if the geodesic distance between the investor’s IP address location and the firm’s headquarters (i.e. as the crow flies) is 
less than or equal to 100 kilometers. SumSize  is the aggregate kilobyte size for all files downloaded for the first time. 
InitialDownloads  is the number of files downloaded for the first time. Redownloads  represents the number of files 
redownloaded. Factor  is the principal component of SumSize, InitialDownloads, and Redownloads. Standard errors are 
clustered by Investor and Firm.
0.4210.472
1,945,6841,945,684 1,945,672
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Equation Dependent Variable Independent Variable coeff t-stat p-value R-squared Obs
(1) SumSize Local 0.348 4.988 0.000 0.442 1,977,931
(1) InitialDownloads Local 0.098 4.578 0.000 0.483 1,977,931
(1) Redownloads Local 0.097 4.398 0.000 0.360 1,977,931
(1) Factor Local 0.184 5.033 0.000 0.469 1,977,931
(2) Retrieval Delay (Two-days) Local -21.782 -2.483 0.013 0.257 291,886
(2) Retrieval Delay (One-hour) Local -0.687 -2.341 0.019 0.376 109,296
(3) Abn_Return t+1 Buyhold t  x Search t  x Local t 0.005 2.400 0.017 0.052 1,556,741
(4) PB1 Local x Factor 0.044 1.848 0.065 0.502 1,738,423
(4) PB2 Local x Factor 0.013 2.800 0.005 0.795 1,738,413
Table 11. Main Findings Controlling for the Level of Investment
Notes: This table presents the coefficients of interest from the main analyses controlling for the level of investment held by the 
institutional investor in the stock at the beginning of the quarter. Local  is an indicator if the geodesic distance between the 
investor’s IP address location and the firm’s headquarters (i.e. as the crow flies) is less than or equal to 100 kilometers. 
SumSize  is the aggregate kilobyte size for all files downloaded for the first time. InitialDownloads  is the number of files 
downloaded for the first time. Redownloads  represents the number of files redownloaded. Factor  is the principal component 
of SumSize, InitialDownloads, and Redownloads. Retrieval Delay  is the difference in minutes between the investor's 
retrieval time of the filing and the time at which the filing was released. Since the exact time of day in which the filing was 
released is unknown, the time of the first viewer is used as a proxy. Abn_Return  is the quarterly firm stock return adjusted by 
the value-weighted market return. Buyhold  is an indicator if the institutional investor's quarter end shares were greater than or 
equal to the previous quarter. Search  is an indicator if the institutional investor searched for firm information on EDGAR 
during the quarter. PB1  is the difference between the investor’s portfolio weight in stock i  and the market portfolio weight in 
stock i . PB2  is the log of the investor’s portfolio weight in stock i  divided by the market portfolio weight in stock i . 
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coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value
Local Investors 0.027 2.534 0.015 0.049 4.155 0.000 0.021 1.936 0.059 0.039 3.498 0.001
Turnover -0.332 -16.276 0.000 -0.338 -16.346 0.000
Return 1.609 4.255 0.000 1.612 4.275 0.000
Firm x Year-qtr FE
Event Type FE
R-squared
Obs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.916 0.920
223,745 223,745
Notes: This table presents the relation between firm-level information asymmetry and the presence of local investors accessing 
the disclosed EDGAR filing on the filing release date. Illiquidity  is the natural log of the Amihud price impact of trade measured 
on the release date of the EDGAR filing (Amihud, 2002). The price impact of trade is calculated as the absolute value of the 
firm stock return divided by the volume of dollars traded. Local  Investors  is an indicator for the EDGAR filing being accessed 
by a local professional investor on the release date. Turnover  is the natural log of the volume of shares traded divided by the 
shares outstanding on the release date of the EDGAR filing. Return  is the firm stock return on the release date of the EDGAR 
filing. Event Type FE is a fixed effect for the seven categories of forms filed with the SEC: (1) Annual Reports, (2) Quarterly 
Reports, (3) IPO Reports, (4) Material Disclosures, (5) Insider Trading Reports, (6) Proxy Statements, or (7) Other Forms. 
Standard errors are cluster by Firm and Year-qtr.
Illiquidity
Table 12. Firm-Level Information Asymmetry and Local Research
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
0.915
223,745
0.919
223,745
No No
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coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value coeff t-stat p-value
Short Travel 0.150 6.962 0.000 0.043 6.283 0.000 0.052 7.458 0.000 0.118 7.025 0.000
Investor x Year-qtr FE
Firm x Year-qtr FE
R-squared
Obs
Notes: This table presents the relation between public information retreival and an investor's travel time to firm headquarters. Short 
Travel  is an indicator if the number of minutes needed to optimally travel between the investor’s IP address location and the firm’s 
headquarters is less than or equal to two hours. SumSize  is the aggregate kilobyte size for all files downloaded for the first time. 
InitialDownloads  is the number of files downloaded for the first time. Redownloads  represents the number of files redownloaded. 
Factor is the principal component of SumSize, InitialDownloads, and Redownloads. All continuous variables are logged to reduce 
the influence of outliers. Standard errors are clustered by Investor and Firm.
0.254
5,941,184
0.220 0.172 0.240
5,941,184 5,941,184 5,941,184
YesYes Yes Yes
YesYes Yes Yes
Table 13. Relation between Public Information Acquisition and Investors' Proximity to Investment 
Using Alternative Measure of Proximity 
InitialDownloadsSumSize Redownloads Factor
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